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L Introduction
On August 5, 1996, Congress enacted the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996 (ILSA).' Congress passed ILSA based on findings that Iran and
* I would like to thank Professor Frederic Kirgis, Dave Butow, and John Dalton for
their invaluable assistance during the development of this Note. I would also like to thank my
family for their constant love and support.
1. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (codified
at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West Supp. 1997)).
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Libya, and their acts in support of international terrorism, endanger the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.2 Section 5
of ILSA requires the President to sanction3 any person4 who, with actual
knowledge,' invests $40 million or more in either Iran or Libya, so long as that
investment directly and significantly contributes to the development of either
country's petroleum resources.6 Congress reasoned that limiting the develop-
ment of Iran's and Libya's petroleum resources would deny them the revenues
produced by such resources and thereby deprive them of the financial means
to support acts of international terrorism.7
ILSA has engendered a significant amount of criticism. Critics claim
that, by purporting to govern "any person," ILSA exceeds the limits imposed
by international law on the United States's jurisdiction to prescribe law."
"Jurisdiction to prescribe" is a state's authority to make its laws applicable to
certain persons or activities.9 This criticism is not surprising given that prior
legislation and regulation based on national security and foreign policy typ-
ically contained rules applicable only to "persons" somehow affiliated with
the United States."
2. Id. § 2(1)-(4).
3. See id. § 6 (listing possible sanctions for person in violation of ILSA); infra note 17
and accompanying text (reproducing Section 6).
4. See Iran and Libya Sanactions Act § 14(14) (defining "person" to include both natural
persons as well as business entities); infra note 18 (reproducing Section 14(14)).
5. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(a) (requiring actual knowledge); infra note 19
(discussing possible meanings and implications of "actual knowledge" requirement).
6. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(a), (b)(2). Section 5 also prohibits certain trans-
actions with Libyathat violate Resolutions 748 and 883 of the United Nations Security Council.
Id. § 5(b)(1); see infra note 16 (discussing Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(b)(1)).
7. See Iran and libya Sanctions Act § 3(a) (declaring that policy behind Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act (ILSA) "is to deny Irn the ability to support acts of international terrorism" by
limiting development of its petroleum resources); see also infra notes 67-68 and accompanying
text (discussing congressional reasoning behind enacting ILSA). Although not explicitly stated,
the policy that lies behind Congress's regulation of investments contributing to the development
of Iran's petroleum resources presumably also lies behind the identical provision that regulates
these same investments in Libya. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(b)(2) (providing regula-
tion identical to that found in § 5(a), but pertaining to investments in Libya rather than Iran).
8. See infra note 55 (providing criticisms from foreign states).
9. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFFOREIGNRELATIONSLAWOFTHEUNITEDSTATES § 401(a)
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (defining "jurisdiction to prescribe" as state's
authority "to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the
interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administra-
tive rule or regulation, or by determination of a court").
10. See Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(1) (1994) (author-
izing President to "prohibit or curtail the export of any goods or technology subject to the juris-
diction of the United States or exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
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This Note examines whether the United States possesses the jurisdiction
to prescribe and enforce ILSA against a person abroad who lacks affiliation
with the United States. Part II analyzes ILSA in detail and sets the stage for
a critical analysis of its legitimacy." Part III discusses how international law
impacts domestic legislation such as ILSA and foreign policy decisions of
states.' 2 Part IV reviews the generally recognized principles of prescriptive
jurisdiction in international law and concludes that ILSA violates these prin-
ciples. 3 Finally, Part V addresses the separate question ofwhether the United
States has the jurisdiction to enforce ILSA.' 4
I1. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
Section 5(a) of ILSA provides that:
[T]he President shall impose 2 or more of the sanctions... [listed in]
section 6 if the President determines that a person has, with actual knowl-
edge .... made an investment of $40,000,000 or more.., that directly and
significantly contributed to the enhancement of Iran's ability to develop
petroleum resources of Iran. 5
Section 5(b)(2) provides an identical provision regulating investments in
Libya.' 6 Possible sanctions for a Section 5 violation include: (1) denying
States" (emphasis added)); 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1996) (prohibiting certain trade between Cuba
and foreign companies owned or controlled by United States resident or national). But see
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) (Helms-Burton) Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-114, § 302, 110 Stat. 785, 815 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082 (West Supp.
1997) (creating right of action in U.S. courts for U.S. nationals against anyperson who profits
from property which Cuban government confiscated after January 1, 1959). The Helms-Burton
Act, like ILSA, has given rise to heated complaints about the scope of its prescriptions that
govern any person. See Lionel Barber, EU Takes Anti-Cuba Legislation to World Trade Body,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1996, at 1 (covering European Union's criticisms of Helms-Burton Act).
11. See infra Part II (analyzing ILSA).
12. See infra Part III (discussing impact of international law on legislation such as ILSA
and foreign policy decisions).
13. See infra Part IV (reviewing principles of prescriptive jurisdiction in international
law).
14. See infra Part V (addressing whether United States has jurisdiction to enforce ILSA).
15. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(a). But see id. § 5(f) (providing exceptions to
mandatory sanctions found in § 5(a) and § 5(b)).
16. Id. § 5(b)(2). Section 5(b)(1) also pertains to Libya. This section mandates the Presi-
dent to sanction any person who, with actual knowledge, provided Libya with goods, services,
technology, or other items prohibited by Resolutions 748 and 883 of the Security Council of
the United Nations. Id. § 5(b)(1). Before the President may impose sanctions under this
section, the provision of such items must significantly and materially: (a) contribute to Libya's
ability to acquire certain weapons; (b) contribute to Libya's ability to develop its petroleum
resources; or (c) contribute to Libya's ability to maintain its aviation capabilities. Id Because
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Export-Import bank financing; (2) denying export licenses; (3) prohibiting
U.S. financial institutions from making loans worth over $10 million per year
to sanctioned persons; (4) prohibiting sanctioned financial institutions from
serving as primary dealers ofU.S. government bonds oras repositories of U.S.
government funds; (5) banning U.S. government procurement of any goods or
services from sanctioned persons; and (6) Presidential import sanctioning in
accordance with the International Economic Powers Act. 7 The President
Section 5(b)(1) deals with violations of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, it involves issues
beyond the scope of this Note. Consequently, this Note focuses solely on Sections 5(a) and
5(b)(2), which regulate the investments in Iran and Libya respectively.
17. See id. § 6 (enumerating possible sanctions under ILSA). Section 6 provides that
upon finding a violation of ILSA:
(1) The President may direct the Export-Import Bank of the United States not to
give approval to the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or
participation in the extension of credit in connection with the export of any goods
or services to any sanctioned person.
(2) The President may order the United States Government not to issue any specific
license and not to grant any other specific permission or authority to export any
goods or technology to a sanctioned person under -
(i) the Export Administration Act of 1979;
(ii) the Arms Export Control Act;
(iii) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
(iv) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United
States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or
services.
(3) The United States Government may prohibit any United States financial insti-
tution from making loans or providing credits to any sanctioned person totaling
more than $10,000,000 in any 12 month period unless such person is engaged in
activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided for such
activities.
(4) The following prohibitions may be imposed against a sanctioned person that is
a financial institution:
(A) Neither the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the continuation
of any prior designation of, such financial institution as a primary dealer in
United States debt instruments.
(3) Such financial institution may not serve as an agent of the United States
Government or serve as a repository for United States Government funds.
The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be treated as
I sanction for purposes of section 5, and the imposition of both sanctions shall be
treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of section 5.
(5) The United States Government may not procure, or enter into any contract for
the procurement of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person.
(6) The President may impose sanctions, as appropriate, to restrict imports with
respect to a sanctioned person, in accordance with the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 and following).
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must impose two or more of these sanctions against any person18 who, with
actual knowledge, 9 violates Section 5, regardless of the person's nationality
or residency. The unusually broad scope of the statute's applicability raises
a difficult question: What authority does Congress have to impose its law on
persons abroad having no connection to the United States? The answer to this
question depends largely on the scope of the United St~tes's jurisdiction to
prescribe law, an issue addressed in Part IV.
III Relevance of International Law
International law is part of our federal law and must be ascertained and
administered by our courts.2" As with all American federal law, however,
Congress may modify or repeal its force and effect within the United States
through subsequent legislative acts.2 Such a congressional modification or
repeal, of course, does not relieve the United States of its obligation to obey
international law.' Moreover, such congressional action does not relieve the
United States of the consequences that stem from a violation of international
law.' Rather, the real effect of such congressional action manifests itself in
the Americanjudiciary. United States courts will enforce national legislation
such as ILSA, and thereby supplant the domestic effect of non-customary
international law, even if the statute violates established international legal
principles.24
18. See id. § 14(14) (defining "person" to include both natural and juridical persons).
Section 14(14) defines "person" as:
(A) a natural person;
(13) a corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, any other non-
governmental entity, organization or group, and any governmental entity operating
as a business enterprise; and
(C) any successor to any entity described in subparagraph (B).
Id.
19. Id. § 5(a). ILSA fails to define "actual knowledge." The term could plausibly take
on either of two meanings: (1) that the person is aware that he is investing $40,000,000 or more
in Iran or Libya; or (2) that the person is aware that his investment of $40,000,000 or more
"directly and significantly" contributes to the development of either country's petroleum
resources. This Note will demonstrate the meaning Congress intended does not affect the con-
clusion that ILSA violates international law.
20. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900) (stating that international law also
serves as American law); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 (same).
21. I. A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (1 th ed. 1994) (citing The Over
the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925)).
22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 115(1)(b) (stating that congressional modification of
international law does not relieve United States of its international obligation).
23. See id. (stating that congressional modification of international law does not relieve
United States of consequences of violation of that obligation).
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 115 cmt. a (stating that "[a]n act of Congress will...
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Although international law may "bend[] to the will of Congress,"' inter-
national law and ILSA's status thereunder still prove important for two major
reasons. First, whether ILSA violates international law determines whether
the United States will be internationally responsible for the harm caused by
U.S. enforcement of the statute. 6 Second, although international law lacks a
central executive for its enforcement, the legality of a statute nevertheless
plays a role in the enacting state's as well as other states' foreign policy
decisions.' If foreign states consider ILSA to be a violation of international
law, they may respond in ways that defeat the effectiveness of the Act.28 For
instance, some states have previously counteracted the extraterritorial effect
of certain U.S. laws by passing statutes prohibiting its nationals from obeying
such laws. 9 This type of retaliatory statute in response to ILSA may force the
United States to abandon the Act altogether, as it has done with prior laws that
other nations considered violative of international law."°
The famous "pipeline" controversy provides the best example of such a
U.S. abandonment.3 ' Under the authority of the Export Administration Act
be given effect as domestic law in the face of an earlier international agreement of the United
States other than a treaty, or a preexisting rule of customary international law").
25. The Over the Top, 5 F.2d at 842.
26. See RESTATE MENT (THIRD) § 901 (discussing redress for violation of international
law).
27. See Louis HENKiN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 88-98 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing role of
international law in state's foreign policy decisions).
28. See SHEARER, supra note 21, at 189 (providing examples of states enacting blocking
statutes in order to counter what they believe to be impermissible extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust laws). In protest to many extraterritorial exercises of United States
jurisdiction in the past, nations have enacted blocking statutes to protect their citizens from
enforcement attempts by the United States. See generally D.L. Jones, Legislative Attempts to
Protect Trading Interests, 8 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 353 (1982) (discussing blocking
statutes); A.V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION (1985) (same); A.V. Lowe, Blocking
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 257 (1981) (discussing British blocking statute). Recently, foreign states have enacted
blocking statutes that create a cause of action for its citizens to recover from judgments incurred
in the United States as a result of the Helms-Burton Act. David E. Sanger, Europe Postpones
Challenge to U.S. on Havana Trade, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1997, at A6.
29. See The Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Reexport Control) Order 1982, re-
printed in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 852 (1982) (ordering certain British companies to
disregard U.S. prohibitions and honor contractual obligations with Soviet Union); Flora Lewis,
France Defies Ban by US. on Supplies for Soviet Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1982, at Al
(discussing French statute that ordered its companies to honor contractual obligations with
Soviet Union despite U.S. regulations prohibiting those companies from doing so).
30. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (discussing example of U.S. abandon-
ment of extraterritorial application of regulations).
31. See Homer E. Moyer, Jr. & Linda A. Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of
Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues, andPolicy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW
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of 1979 (EAA), President Reagan responded to the Soviet Union's partial
responsibility for the repression in Poland by prohibiting the provision of oil
and gas equipment to the Soviet Union.32 This prohibition covered exports
and re-exports of U.S.-origin goods as well as goods produced by foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. companies.33 Perhaps even more controversial, the
prohibition applied to products of completely independent, foreign corpora-
tions that had produced these goods under a licensing agreement with an
American company.34 The European Economic Community strongly protested
these prohibitions on the ground that the prohibitions violated international
law.35 This opposition to the regulations eventually led the United States to
&POL'YINT'LBus. 1, 60-92 (1982) (discussing "pipeline" controversy); RobertB. Thompson,
UnitedStatesJurisdictionOverForeignSubsidiaries: CorporateandlnternationalLawA spects,
15 LAw &POL'Y INT'L Bus. 319, 354-56 (1982) (same); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of
the Export Administration Act of 1979 Under International and American Law, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 1308, 1308-36 (1983) (analyzing legal issues underlying "pipeline" controversy).
32. See Amendment of Oil and Gas Controls to the U.S.S.R., 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250,
27,250-52 (1982) (not codified because act repealed). These regulations under the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1994), proposed the following modifi-
cation to 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c):
(c)(1) As authorized by Section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979,
prior written authorization by the Office of Export Administration is required for
foreign policy reasons for the export orreexportto the U.S.S.R. of oil and gas explor-
ation, production, transmission ofrefinement goods of U.S. origin as defined in CCL
entries 6098F, 6191F, 6388F, 6389F, 6390F, 6391F, 643 IF, 6491F, 6598F, 6685F,
6779F, and 6780F. Also included in the scope of this control are technical data of
U.S. origin (other than that authorized under General License GTDA) related to oil
and gas exploration, production, transmission and refinement and other goods that
require a validated export license for shipment to the Soviet Union and that are
intended for use in oil or gas exploration, production, transmission or refinement.
The foreign product of such data is also controlled (§ 379.8). The term "refinement"
includes refinery operations directed to energy usage, but excludes petrochemical
feedstock processes. In addition, prior written authorization is required for the export
to the U.S.S.R. of non-U.S. origin goods and technical data by any person subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States.
(2) For the purposes of this § 385.2(c) only, the term "person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" includes
(i) Any person, wherever located, who is acitizen orresident oftheUnited States;
(ii) Any person actually within the United States;
(iii) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any
state, territory, possession, or district of the United States; or
(iv) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, wherever
organized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by persons specified in




35. See European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade
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abandon its enforcement.36 Similarly, strong international opposition to ILSA
as violative of international law could lead the United States to repeal or to
amend the Act.
IV. Generally Recognized Principles of Jurisdiction to Prescribe Law
and Their Bearing on ILSA
International law arises from two primary sources: international agree-
ments and international custom." Similar to contracts, international agree-
ments bind only the states that consent to them.38 Customary international
law, however, generally binds all states. 39 The formation of a customary inter-
national law requires the presence of two elements: (1) a factual element -
the repetition of similar acts by the states, and (2) a psychological element
called the opiniojuris sive necessitatis - the feeling on the part of the states
that they are acting in accordance with a legal obligation."
Customary international law has established that a nation may havejuris-
diction to prescribe law with respect to:
41
with the U.S.S.R., 21 INTL LEGAL MATERIALS 891 (1982) (discussing European Community's
objection to President Reagan's prohibitions on certain trade with former Soviet Union). In
addition to complaints from foreign governments, some foreign courts refused to respect the
regulations. See Compagnie Europeenne Des Petroles S.A. v. SensorNederland B.V., 22 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 66 (1982) (providing Dutch court's refusal to recognize United States
regulations that prohibited company from fulfilling contractual obligations with Soviet Union
as breach of contract defense).
36. See Richard M. Weintraub, President Lifts Sanctions on Soviet Pipeline, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 14, 1982, at Al (noting U.S. abatement of sanctions under regulations that gave rise
to pipeline controversy). But see Bernard Gwertzman, Reagan Lifts the Sanctions on Sales For
Soviet Pipeline; Reports Accord With Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1982, at Al (stating that
United States lifted sanctions because of agreements reached with allies regarding plan to
restrict trade with Soviet Union, not because of pressure from objecting states).
37. Allen DeLoach Stewart, New World Ordered: TheAssertedExtraterritorialJurisdic-
tion of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 53 LA. L. REv. 1389, 1392 (1993). See generally
IAN BROwNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-14 (4th ed. 1990).
38. Stewart, supra note 37, at 1392.
39. Id. International law recognizes a rare exception to the principle that customary law
is binding upon all states when a state has persistently refused to follow the practice from which
the rule has developed. BROWNLIE, supra note 37, at 10.
40. Lazare Kopelmanas, Customs as a Means ofthe Creation ofInternationalLaw, 1937
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 127, 129; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 101 (discussing formation of cus-
tomary international law).
41. See RESTATEMENT (THID) §§ 402,404 (providing list of jurisdictional principles).
Throughout its discussion ofjurisdictional principles of customary international law, this Note
cites many judicial decisions, mainly from U.S. courts, supporting and explaining these prin-
ciples. It is important to understand that case law is not binding authority for the existence of
a customary international law. Judicial decisions do, however, serve the important purpose of
1608
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(1) Conduct that takes place within its territory and issues regarding the
status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory
(Territoriality Principle).
42
(2) Conduct occurring outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effects within its territory (Objective Territoriality Prin-
ciple or Effects Principle);
43
(3) Activities of its own nationals outside as well as within its territory
(Nationality Principle);"
(4) Conduct of nonnationals outside its territory that is directed against
the security of the state or against a limited class of other state inter-
ests (Protective Principle);45 and
(5) Certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of uni-
versal concern, such as piracy, war crimes, genocide, hijacking of
aircraft, slave trade, and perhaps certain types of terrorism (Univer-
sality Principle).46
Each of these jurisdictional principles constitutes an independent basis
for jurisdiction. A statute that cannot find justification for its prescription in
one or more of these principles violates international law.47 Furthermore,
even if ILSA falls within one of these jurisdictional principles, its legality
under international law ultimately depends on whether such an exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction is reasonable.4 International law, however, does not
require a showing of reasonableness when the universality principle justifies
evidencing a pattern of practice in the international community (the first requisite element to
establishing a customary international law). See supra note 40 and accompanying text (pro-
viding elements of customary international law).
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(1)(a), (b).
43. Id. § 402(l)(c).
44. Id. § 402(2).
45. Id. § 402(3).
46. Id § 404. The Restatement (Third) also recognizes some other bases for extra-
territorial jurisdiction. For instance, under the passive personality principle, a state has juris-
diction to prescribe law - particularly criminal law - to an act committed outside its territory
by a person not its national where the victim of the act was its national. Id. § 402 cmt. g. A
prime example of a state's exercise of the passive personality principle can be found in the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act of 1986. 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (1994). The
Act makes it a crime to kill, or attempt to conspire to kill, or to cause serious bodily injury, to
a national of the United States outside the territory of the United States. Id.; see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 402 reporters' note 3 (providing examples of state's exercise of passive personality
principle).
47. See RESTATEMENT (THIMR) §§ 402, 404 (suggesting that principles mentioned in §
402 as well as universality principle examined under § 404 serve as only grounds on which state
may assert prescriptive jurisdiction).
48. See id, § 403 (discussing reasonableness requirement).
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an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction.49 Thus, to meet the requirements of
international law, ILSA must withstand a two-step test. First, one of the
jurisdictional principles must support the prescriptions in ILSA. Second,
ILSA must satisfy the reasonableness requirement unless the universality prin-
ciple legitimately applies, in which case international law does not require a
showing of reasonableness. As shown below, ILSA, with its provisions
governing investment activities of noncitizens abroad, fails both prongs of the
test. Consequently, Congress lacked the prescriptive jurisdiction to pass
ILSA, and therefore, the statute violates international law.
A. Territoriality Principle
The sovereignty and equal status of each nation are among the most
fundamental precepts of international law." From this respect for each state's
sovereignty and equality flows the territoriality principle, which provides a
state with jurisdiction to prescribe rules concerning property, persons, and
activities within its territory.5' The territoriality principle cannot serve as a
jurisdictional basis for ILSA. This principle would only support regulation
of the investment activities of persons within the United States. 2 ILSA,
however, regulates persons both inside and outside U.S. borders,53 and thus,
the territoriality principle cannot support these prescriptions.
The territoriality principle is, however, relevant to an understanding of
the jurisdictional conflict surrounding ILSA. This principle reflects a central
49. See id. § 404 (providing that exercise ofjurisdiction under universality principle need
not meet reasonableness requirement).
50. BRowNLIE, supra note 37, at 287.
51. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) § 402(1)(a), (b). In discussingtheterritoriality principle, Lord
MacMillan stated: "It is an essential attribute of the sovereignty of this realm, as it is of all sov-
ereign independent states, that it should possess jurisdiction over all persons and things within
its territorial limits, and in all causes civil and criminal, arising within these limits." Compania
Naviera Vascongada v. Steamship Christina, I All E.R. 719, 725 (H.L. 1938). Territoriality
stands as the most universally recognized jurisdictional base and for good reason. See Harold
G. Maier, Jurisdictional Rules in Customary International Law, in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURIS-
DICTION iN THEORY AND PRACTICE 64, 67 (Karl M. Meessen ed., 1996) (asserting that
territoriality principle "is the most universally recognised [principle] because control over
defined territory is not only a legal prerequisite for statehood but is also essential to permit a
state's government to be responsible to other nations for internal compliance with its external
community commitments").
52. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (explaining territoriality principle).
53. See supra note 18 (providing ILSA's definition of "person" to include all persons,
regardless of nationality or locality). ILSA also regulates persons inside U.S. borders. See
supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing how ILSA governs any person, regardless of
person's locality). In this respect the territoriality principle does support ILSA. However, this
Note focuses on whether ajurisdictional principle supports ILSA's regulation of noncitizens
abroad who have no affiliation with the United States.
1610
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attribute of every sovereign state -the authority to control activities within its
borders. Thus, one state's attempt to apply its rules to persons or activities in
another's territory often infringes on the latter state's sense of sovereignty
and thereby produces serious resentment and objection. 4 By regulating cer-
tain investment practices of persons situated in other states, ILSA infringes
upon the territorial jurisdiction, and arguably the sovereignty, of the states in
which these persons act.5 Thus, whether ILSA amounts to an impermissible
infringement depends on whether the Act can be grounded in another juris-
dictional principle and also on whether such an exercise ofjurisdiction would
pass the reasonableness test.
B. Effects Principle
International law also recognizes a state's jurisdiction to prescribe rules
of law regulating conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
a substantial effect within its territory.56 Thisjurisdictional basis is commonly
known as the "effects" principle or the "objective territoriality" principle. As
the latter term suggests, the effects principle derives from the territoriality
principle. 7 The relationship between the objective territoriality principle and
the territoriality principle arises from the understanding that acts done outside
ajurisdiction, but producing or intended to produce substantial effects within
a jurisdiction, justify a state's regulation of the person causing, or intending
to cause, the effect as ifhe had beenpresent within the territory."8 The effects
54. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)
(stating that "[a]ny restriction upon [a state's territorial jurisdiction] from an external source
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty").
55. See ASEAN Questions US Sanctions Law Against Libya and Iran, Agence France-
Presse, Sept. 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12136528 (covering concern by Association of
Southeast AsiaNations over ILSAsanctions on non-U.S. companies) [hereinafterASEANQues-
ions]; Barber, supra note 10, at I (covering European Union's criticisms of ILSA and Helms-
Burton Act); James Kynge, Malaysia Angered by US Sanctions Threat, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1,
1996, at 6 (providing foreign opposition to ILSA). Izhar Ibrahim, Indonesia's Director General
of Political Affairs, stated that ILSA "does not conform with the principles of international law.
It is the law of one state being imposed on another." ASEAN Questions, supra. In response to
ILSA, Mahathir Mohanad, Malaysia's Prime Minister, stated: "We are a sovereign nation ....
We will not submit to US dictation." Kynge, supra, at 6.
56. RESTATEMENT (THMRD) § 402(1)(c); see United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294,
1296 (5th Cir. 1974) (invoking effects principle to establish jurisdiction over cashing abroad
of stolen U.S. social security checks drawn on U.S. Treasury); D.P.P. v. Doot, I All E.R. 940
(H.L. 1973) (invoking effects principle to establishjurisdiction to apply English law to conspir-
acy entered into outside England but intended to occur inside its territory); Lotus Case, 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (invoking effects principle to establish Turkey's jurisdiction to apply
Turkish law to officers of French ship that collided with Turkish ship on high seas).
57. See supra part IV.A (explaining territoriality principle).
58. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280,285 (1911) (explaining how effects principle
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principle serves as a justification for the punishment of acts such as firing a
gun into another state's territory or sending libelous publications across a
state's boundary.59 Other examples of conduct abroad that have been subject
to jurisdiction under the effects principle include acts of conspiracy' and
violations of antitrust laws.6' The international community's acceptance of
the principle is not only logical, but also is necessary: To deny a state the
authority to regulate activities outside its borders that produce or were in-
tended to produce substantial effects within its borders would place each state
and its citizens at the mercy of the internal acts and politics of every other
state.
62
The effects principle cannotjustify the prescriptions in ILSA. First, the
international community does not uniformly agree that the effects principle
can justify the regulation of activity outside a state's boundaries when the
activity complies with the laws of the state in which the acts were carried
out.63 This uncertainty over a state's authority to regulate acts that are lawful
in the state from which they originate casts doubt on the legitimacy of ILSA
under the effects principle, in as much as ILSA regulates investment activities
that are perfectly lawful where carried out."
or objective territoriality principle derived from territoriality principle); United States v. Egan,
501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same).
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 cmt. d.
60. See generally D.P.P., 1 All E.R. 940 (invoking effects principle to establish jurisdic-
tion to apply English law to conspiracy entered into outside England but intended to occur
inside its territory); R. v. Baxter, 2 All E.R. 359 (C.A. 1971) (invoking effects principle to
establish jurisdiction to apply English law to attempts to obtain property unlawfully by sending
deceptive material from Ireland).
61. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d. Cir.
1979) (invoking effects principle to justify applying Sherman Anti-Trust Act to acts abroad);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976)
(invoking effects principle to establish jurisdiction to apply Sherman Anti-Trust Act abroad,
even though most of acts took place in Honduras and allegations generally concerned foreign
citizens); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945) (util-
izing effects principle to justify applying Sherman Anti-Trust Act to acts abroad). For a foreign
court decision applying the effects principle in the antitrust setting, see Imperial Chem. Indus.,
Ltd. v. Commission, [1971-73] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8001, 8030 (E.C.J. 1972) (invoking
effects principle to justify EEC Commission's regulation of restrictive business practices that
take place outside common market).
62. See Maer, supra note 51, at66 (discussing effects doctrine as articulated in Lotus case).
63. See RESTATEMENT (THMD) § 402 reporters' note 2 (providing controversial examples
of states using effects principle to justify application of economic regulation - such as antitrust
laws - on basis of economic effects of certain acts, which were lawful where carried out); see
also supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (discussing United States prohibitions on foreign
companies from supplying certain products to Soviet Union).
64. See supra note 55 (citing examples of states that have specifically refrained from regu.
lating investments at issue in ILSA).
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Second, the plain language of the effects principle provides even stronger
evidence that it cannot justify ILSA. As stated above, a state has jurisdiction
to prescribe rules concerning conduct outside its territory that has or is in-
tended to have a substantial effect within its territory.65 Thus, the effects
principle provides two situations in which the United States may have pre-
scriptivejurisdiction: (1) when the regulated conduct in fact has a substantial
effect in the United States, regardless of intent; or (2) when a person acts with
the intent to produce a substantial effect within the United States. A brief
discussion of each situation demonstrates that the effects principle cannot
justify ILSA.
The act of investing in Iran's or Libya's petroleum resources lacks a
sufficient nexus to the United States to claim tenably that such conduct has a
substantial effect in the United States. In Section 3 of ILSA, Congress de-
clared that the U.S. objective is to deny Iran and Libya the ability to support
acts of international terrorism by limiting the development of their petroleum
resources." Thus, by regulating investment in either state's petroleum re-
sources, Congress sought to disrupt the following chain of causation:67 (1) an
investment in Iran or Libya's petroleum development increases their revenues;
(2) an increase in revenues allows Iran and Libya to increase their funding of
international terrorists and their acts of terrorism; (3) these states in fact
devote more of their revenues toward funding terrorists; (4) with increased
funding, the terrorist groups perform more terrorist acts; and (5) the increase
in terrorists acts include more acts against the United States, thereby produc-
ing a substantial effect within the United States.
In order for the first formulation of the effects principle to support ILSA,
one must determine that the investment activity addressed in ILSA has a
substantial effect within the United States, not that the act of investing may
have a substantial effect within the United States. The causal chain above
indicates only that investment in Iran's or Libya's petroleum resources could
possibly have a substantial effect in the United States. It falls short of demon-
strating that such investment will necessarily have a substantial effect in the
65. RE TAramENT (THiRD) § 402(l)(c).
66. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 3.
67. See H.R. REP.No. 104-523, pt. 2, at 14 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311,
1316 (discussing Congress's rationale behind ILSA). The House Report states that:
[I]nvestment in the petroleum sector in Iran and Libya is generating revenues which
facilitate the ability of [both governments] to carry out unlawful and immensely
threatening behavior.... Without foreign investment, production of Iran's oil and
gas sector will fall, which will choke off revenue to the government of Iran and
thereby deny it the resources it employs to threaten the national security interests
of the United States.
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United States. Too many variables could easily cause a break in Congress's
speculative reasoning.
If the effects principle justified ILSA, absurd implications would follow.
For example, if the principle provided justification, the United States theoreti-
cally would have jurisdiction to pass legislation prohibiting any person from
providing humanitarian aid to the people of Iran. This type of assistance
would free up Iranian revenues that could be spent funding international terror-
ists. Furthermore, this increase in revenues could set off the same chain of
causation that Congress used to justify the regulation of the investment activi-
ties in ILSA.
Both the act of investing in petroleum resources and the act of providing
humanitarian aid possibly could have a substantial effect in the United States,
but the effects principle does not support regulations based on such tenuous
chains of causation. Indeed, the idea that a state could utilize the effects prin-
ciple to regulate conduct based on results that such conduct may or may not
produce gives rise to a common concern with this principle - that it could
provide a state with potentially limitless jurisdiction to prescribe law.68
Consequently, American and foreign courts tend to interpret the effects prin-
ciple as requiring that the conduct directly affect the state attempting to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.69 Direct effects do not depend upon
intervening events.70 Rather, direct effects flow from their source without
68. See Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 1972-73 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L.
L. 145, 154 (describing effects principle as "a slippery slope which leads away from the terri-
torial principle towards universal jurisdiction"); R.Y. Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and
the United States Antitrust Laws 1957 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 146, 159 (stating that "[i]f indeed it
were permissible to found objective territorial jurisdiction upon the territoriality of more or less
remote repercussions of an act wholly performed in another country, then there were virtually
no limit to a State's territorial jurisdiction"); see also Note, supra note 31, at 1327-28 (discus-
sing potentially limitless scope ofjurisdiction founded on effects principle).
69. See Carey v. National Oil Corp. 453 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding
no direct effect in United States from contract breaches with American foreign subsidiary), aff'd
per curiam, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979); Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264, 266
(D.D.C. 1978) (finding no direct effect in United States from collapse of airport terminal roof
in Iran causing American deaths), affidmem., 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Note, supra note
31, at 1329 (citing cases supporting requirement of direct effect and discussing direct effect
requirement); see also United States v. Javino 960 F.2d 1137, 1143 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding in
dicta that making of firearms in foreign country - unless imported into United States - has too
attenuated effect to supportjurisdiction). Butsee Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp.
1281, 1286-87 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (finding direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect from impor-
tation of defective gun that caused physical injury in United States). For a foreign court's
interpretation of the effects principle as requiring a direct effect, see Compagnie Europeenne
Des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B. V., 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERALS 66, 72-74 (1982)
(stressing importance of examining whether acts in question "have direct and illicit effects with-
in the territory of the United States").
70. Note, supra note 31, at 1329.
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deviation or interruption.7 At best, the conduct regulated by ILSA indirectly
affects the United States. The only direct effects in the United States, if any,
arise from the acts of the terrorists allegedly supported by the Iranian and
Libyan governments.7' ILSA, however, does not regulate these acts.
The second formulation of the effects principle provides a state with
jurisdiction to prescribe rules concerning conduct intendedto have substantial
effect in the state.73 This version, like the first, does not support ILSA. ILSA
regulates any person who, with actual knowledge, invests in the development
of Iran's or Libya's petroleum resources.74 Thus, the President must sanction
a person under ILSA regardless of whether the person intended for her invest-
ment to produce effects, such as those stemming from terrorist acts, in the
United States. Therefore, at the very least, ILSA is overbroad. For the effects
principle to support prescriptive jurisdiction, Congress would have to tailor
the language of ILSA to regulate only those persons who contribute to either
country's petroleum resources with the intent that such a contribution have a
substantial effect in the United States.
In sum, the effects principle fails to provide a jurisdictional basis for
ILSA. The investment activity regulated by ILSA does not have a direct and
substantial effect in the United States. Moreover, ILSA purports to regulate
behavior not intended to produce substantial effects in the United States.
C. Nationality Principle
International law recognizes a state's authority to prescribe rules for its
citizens either within or outside its territory.75 By definition, the nationality
71. Id.
72. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress andCuba: The Helms-BurtonAct, 9OAM.J.INT'L
L. 419, 431 (arguing that effect against which Helms-Burton Act is directed, if any, was caused
by government of Cuba, not by persons over whom United States seeks to exercise jurisdiction).
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(1)(c); see id. § 402 cmt. d.
When the intent to commit the proscribed act is clear and demonstrated by some
activity, and the effect to be produced by the activity is substantial and foreseeable,
the fact that a plan or conspiracy was thwarted does not deprive the target state of
jurisdiction to make its law applicable.
Id States commonly exercisejurisdiction based on this version of the effects principle in cases
of conspiracy, where the objective is thwarted before the ill effects are felt in the target state.
See United States v. Brown, 549 F.2d 954, 956-57 (4th Cir. 1977) (invoking effects principle
to establish jurisdiction over conspiracy to import heroin from West Germany); United States
v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The fact that the planned consequences of
the plot did not come to fruition, and thereby did not directly injure any United States citizen
does not wrest jurisdiction over the prosecution from the court.").
74. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(a).
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(2). The nationality principle has been an often used
justification forpriorforeign policy legislation. The ComprehensiveAnti-ApartheidActof 1986
provided that"[n]o national of the United States may, directly orthrough anotherperson, make
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principle cannot support ILSA's prescriptions applicable to the group of
persons with whom this Note is concerned - noncitizens abroad.76
D. Protective Principle
The protective principle provides a state with jurisdiction to prescribe
laws governing conduct outside its territory directed against the security of the
state or against a limited class of other state interests.77 The protective princi-
ple only applies to acts generally recognized as crimes by developed legal
systems.78 Examples of such offenses include espionage, counterfeiting of the
state's seal or currency, falsification of official documents, perjury before
consular officials, and conspiracy to violate immigration or customs laws.79
The protective principle cannot serve as ajurisdictional basis for ILSA.
First, ILSA does not regulate conduct directed against U.S. national security
any new investment in South Africa." Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-440, § 310,100 Stat 1086, 1102 (1986) (repealed 1993). A more controversial use of the
nationality principle arises when a state applies its laws to foreign subsidiaries which are owned
or controlled by nationals ofthe regulating state. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 414 (addressing
state's jurisdiction with respect to activities of foreign branches and subsidiaries). For instance,
regulations promulgated under the Cuban Democracy Act prohibit foreign firms owned or con-
trolled by United Statesnationals from engaging in certain transactions with Cuba or its nationals.
See Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6005 (1994) (enabling regulations of transactions with
Cuba); 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1996) (providing regulations under Cuban Democracy Act).
76. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5 (imposing no restrictions on nationality or
locality of person against whom United States may impose sanctions). If Congress limited
ILSA to the regulation of only U.S. nationals, the United States would have a stronger argument
for ILSA's legality under international law. Even employing this limitation, however, the
nationality principle may still fail to justify ILSA. See BROWNLIE, supra note 37, at 303 (dis-
cussing how nationality principle often applies to serious offenses only).
77. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding U.S. juris-
diction to prohibit foreign citizens from knowingly making false statements in visa application
to U.S. consular officials because defendant's action had potentially adverse effect on govern-
mental function of United States); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 550 (9th Cir. 1961)
(prosecuting defendants for conspiring abroad to arrange sham marriages between aliens and
American citizens); United States v. Evans, 667 F. Supp. 974,981 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (upholding
U.S. regulation of foreign persons who wish to resell American-made defense articles); United
States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196,198 (D. Mass. 1985) (recognizing jurisdiction to regulate acts
of espionage against United States that occurred outside U.S. territory); United States v. Rodri-
guez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 491 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (prosecuting defendants for false statements on
immigration applications) af'dinpart, rev 'd inpartsub nom. Rochav. United States, 288 F.2d
545 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Chandler, 72 F. Supp. 230, 233 (D. Mass. 1947) (finding
jurisdiction to apply U.S. treason law to defendant regardless of whether violation occurred
outside U.S. territory); see alsoRESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(3) & cmt. f(discussing protective
principle). For a Dutch court's recognition of the protective principle, see Compagnie Euro-
peenne Des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B. V., 22 INT. LEGAL MATERIALS 66 (1982).
78. RESTATEmENT (THIRD) § 402 cmt. f.
79. See id. (listing examples of acts over which states may prescribe laws pursuant to
protective principle); see also supra note 77 (citing cases invoking protective principle).
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interests nor against any other U.S. interest recognized by the protective prin-
ciple.8" Rather, ILSA regulates any person who engages in the investment
activity described in the Act, regardless of whether that person directed the
investments against, or intended to affect, the national security interests ofthe
United States or any other interest relevant to the protection principle. Sec-
ond, as stated above, in order for the protective principle to justify ILSA,
developed legal systems typically must recognize the regulated act as a
crime. Developed legal systems have not recognized the act of investing in
the development of another state's petroleum resources as a crime; therefore,
the protective principle cannot apply.82
E. Universality Principle
Under the universality principle, every state has jurisdiction to pre-
scribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the international commu-
nity as being of universal concern. 3 Examples of such offenses include"
piracy, 5 war crimes,86 slave trading, 7 hijacking aircrafts,"8 genocide,89 and
80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(3) (requiring that in order for protective principle
to apply, regulated conduct must be "directed against the national security interests of the state
or against a limited class of other state interests"). Congress based ILSA on U.S. national
security interests as well as foreign policy interests. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 2. Foreign
policy interests do not qualify under the "limited class of other state interests" on the basis of
which a state may prescribe law pursuant to the protective principle. OPPENHEIM's INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 471 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 402(3) (stating that protective principle applies only in cases where actor directs
conduct against security of state or against "a limited class of other state interests"). Thus,
because Congress proffered no other interests that may qualify under this "limited class," this
Note will focus on whether the investment activities sufficiently affect U.S. national security
interests so as to justify use of the protective principle to support ILSA's prescriptions.
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 cmt. f("International law recognizes the right of a state
to punish ... offenses directed against the security of the state or other offenses threatening the
integrity of governmental functions that are generally recognized as crimes by developed legal
systems.. ").
82. See supra note 55 (providing objections to ILSA from European Union, under whose
laws persons may lawfully engage in investment activity regulated by ILSA).
83. RESTATEMENT (THIR) § 404.
84. See id. (providing acts which fall under universality principle). The Restatement
interprets the universality principle broadly to include all the acts mentioned in the text of this
Note. Id. Some view the universality principle much more narrowly. See BROwNLE, supra
note 37, at 304-05 (asserting that only piracy definitely falls under universality principle);
SHEARER, supra note 21, at 212 (claiming that only two clear-cut cases fall under universality
principle: piracy and war crimes).
85. RESTATEMENT(THiRD) § 404; see United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 161
(1820) (stating that it is "the general practice of all nations in punishing all persons, whether
natives or foreigners, who have committed [piracy] against any persons whatsoever").
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 404; see Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 Int'l
L. Rep. 277,297-98 (Sup. Ct. of Israel 1962) (finding prescriptive jurisdiction over war crimes
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certain acts of terrorism. 9 The heinous nature of these acts justifies giving
every state jurisdiction to apply and to enforce its laws against the offender.9'
The offender's nationality is irrelevant to the universality principle, as is the
effect of the offender's conduct in the state attempting to exercise juris-
diction.92 The international community considers persons carrying out these
acts to be "enemies of all people."93 Providing every state with jurisdiction
to address these offenses ensures, as much as possible, that they do not go
unpunished.'
Consider the following argument defending ILSA under the universality
principle: In the eyes of many, Iran and Libya are terrorist states. Presum-
and acts ofgenocide pursuantto universality principle); Demjanjukv. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571,
581-83 (6th Cir. 1985) (recognizing Israel's jurisdiction to apply its laws to defendant alleged
to have committed war crimes within Nazi concentration camps). In Eiehmann, the supreme
court of Israel found jurisdiction to apply its laws to defendant for his acts as the principle
executioner of Hitler's "final solution." Eichmann, 36 Int'l L. Rep. at 287. Pursuant to the
universality principle, the Eichmann court found prescriptivejurisdiction overthese acts despite
fact that the defendant was not a citizen of Israel and the defendant committed the acts both
outside of Israel and before Israel became a nation. Id. at 283-84. In Demjanjuk, the court
faced the issue of whether to fulfill Israel's request for the extradition of the defendant, charged
with offenses stemming from his acts in Nazi concentration camps. Demjanjuk 776 F.2d at
576, 578-79. Although defendant committed none of the offense in the requesting state, a usual
condition to extradition, the court ruled that, pursuant to the universality principle, Israel has
prescriptive jurisdiction over the defendant's acts. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582.
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 404.
88. Id.; see Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 901 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding that United States had
jurisdiction to prescribe punishment for hijacking of Jordanian civilian aircraft), aff'd, 924 F.2d
1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
89. RE TATEMENT (THIRD) § 404; see Eichmann, 36 Int'l L. Rep. at 297-98 (finding pre-
scriptive jurisdiction over war crimes and acts of genocide pursuant to universality principle).
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 404. The inability of the international community to agree
on what constitutes terrorism prevents it from definitely representing an offense over which all
states have prescriptive jurisdiction. See id. cmt. a (discussing lack of agreement in interna-
tional community on definition of terrorism). Nevertheless, states generally accept as falling
under the universality principle terrorist acts such as assaults on the life of diplomatic officials,
kidnaping, and indiscriminate assaults against people at large. Id
91. See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 900 (recognizing that protective principle applies to
heinous and widely condemned acts); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340,
1344 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (stating that any state may take universal jurisdiction over "heinous"
crimes); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 404 cmt. a (suggesting that universality principle rests on
universal condemnation of those activities that fall under principle).
92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 404 (imposing no citizenship or effects requirement in
order to exercise jurisdiction under universality principle).
93. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985); see United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 161 (1820) (acknowledging every state'sjurisdiction over piracy
because it represents "an offense against the law of nations, [and] ... an offense against the
universal law of society, [and because a pirate is] ... an enemy of the human race").
94. SHEARER, supra note 21, at 212.
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ably, the universality principle provides the United States with jurisdiction to
prescribe punishments not only for those who carry out these acts of terrorism,
but also for those who support or assist these acts. Thus, the United States
may permissibly prescribe rules regarding those who invest in Iran or Libya
because investment in a known terrorist state is tantamount to support of that
state's terrorist acts or that state's participation in terrorist acts. Essentially,
the argument rests on an accomplice liability theory."
This argument contains a major flaw. The act of investing in petroleum
resources of a known terrorist state does not meet the requirement for justifi-
cation under the universality principle - the community of nations does not
recognize this investment activity as an offense that universally concerns all
states. 6 Further, those who invest in Iran's or Libya's petroleum resources do
not represent "common enemies of all mankind."97 Indeed, if the investment
acts regulated by ILSA were so heinous and so widely condemned so that
jurisdiction could be based on the universality principle," the European Union
and other states would not be objecting so adamantly to ILSA.99 One cannot
tenably classify the investment acts regulated in ILSA with acts of genocide,
piracy, or hijacking an aircraft. At the very least, the United States should
amend ILSA to include an intent requirement before attempting to justify the
Act under the universality principle. Such a requirement should demand that,
before imposing sanctions, the President must determine that the person
intended to support the terrorist acts of Iran or Libya. Currently, ILSA only
requires a finding that the person knowingly invested in the petroleum re-
sources of Iran or Libya.
95. See Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act Is Consistent with Inter-
nationalLaw, 90 AM. J. INT'LL. 434,437 (making accomplice liability argument to justify U.S.
jurisdiction to enact Helms-Burton Act). Clagett argues for the Helms-Burton Act's legitimacy
under international law. Id.; see supra note 10 (explaining Helms-Burton Act). Clagett asserts
that the United States has jurisdiction over noncitizens abroad who knowingly and intentionally
deal in or benefit from property that the Cuban government wrongfully expropriated from
United States citizens in the early 1960s. Clagett, supra, at 437. Clagett argues that those per-
sons who knowingly benefit from such property are culpable and as subject to U.S. prescriptive
jurisdiction (under the effects principle) as those who carried out the acts of confiscation. Id.
96. Seesupranote55 (providing international community's objections to ILSA); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 404 (providing that universality principle only justifies rules concern-
ing "offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern").
97. In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 555 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (asserting that universal
principle provides every state with jurisdiction over persons whose acts make them enemies of
all mankind, prosecution of whom every state has an equal interest in punishing).
98. See United Statesv. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896,900 (D.D.C. 1988) (acknowledgingthat
universality principle only applies to heinous and widely condemned acts); see also RESTATE-
MET (THIRD) § 404 cmt. a ("Universal jurisdiction over the specified offenses is a result of
universal condemnation of th[e]se activities .... ).
99. See supra note 55 (citing heated objections to ILSA).
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A second flaw in the attempt to justify ILSA under the universality
principle also exists. Commentators and at least one court have suggested that
the universality principle does not cover terrorism, or that it only covers some
forms of terrorism." Some commentators go further and claim that the
universality principle applies only to piracy and war crimes.' Nevertheless,
even if the universality principle applies to acts of terrorism, the mere act of
investing in a terrorist state does not amount to a heinous act, recognized by
the international community as being of universal concern.
Thus, none of the jurisdictional principles provide support for the extra-
territorial application of ILSA to noncitizens abroad. Consequently, ILSA
violates international law. If, however, one of the jurisdictional principles
supported ILSA, the Act still would have to meet the reasonableness require-
ment, discussed below, to establish legality under international law. This
additional consideration is necessary in every case exceptforjustificationunder
the universality principle, which does not require attendant reasonableness.0 3
If the universality principle justifies a state's exercise of prescriptive jurisdic-
tion, the inquiry ends and jurisdiction is legitimate under international law.
F. Reasonableness
Situations often arise in which the jurisdictional principles outlined
above-territoriality, effects, nationality, protective, and universality-enable
two or more states to claim prescriptive jurisdiction over certain conduct. For
example, one state may prescribe rules based on the territoriality principle,
and another state may prescribe rules based on the nationality principle."'s
Similarly, one state may prescribe rules governing activities in its territory,
and another state may prescribe rules based on the effect that such activities
produced in its territory.,' If any of the jurisdictional principles discussed
100. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring) (asserting that terrorism does not amount to offense over which every state has
jurisdiction under universality principle); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 80,
at 470 (suggesting that universality principle may not cover terrorism); SHEARER, supra note
21, at 212 (claiming that only two clear-cut cases fall under universality principle: piracy and
war crimes). But see Note, Terrorism as a Tort in Violation ofthe Law ofNations, 6 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 236, 242 (1982) (asserting that terrorism represents violation of law of nations).
101. See supra note 84 (providing examples of commentators who view universality prin-
ciple as only definitely covering piracy and war crimes).
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 404 (providing that universality principle confers state
with prescriptive jurisdiction only over offenses recognized by community of nations as being
of universal concern).
103. See id. (providing that exercise ofjurisdiction under universality principle need not
meet reasonableness requirement).
104. Id § 403 cmt. d.
105. Id.
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above justify ILSA, then the situation would exist where both the United
States and the state in which the investment activities originated may arguably
claim prescriptive jurisdiction.
Because of the potential for overlapping jurisdictional authority, custom-
ary international law recognizes that even when one of the above-mentioned
bases for jurisdiction supports a state's law, a state may not prescribe rules
governing activities having connections with another state when the exercise
of such jurisdiction would be unreasonable." As demonstrated above, none
of the recognized jurisdictional principles justify ILSA. °7 Assuming, how-
ever, that the United States did have legitimate support from one of these
principles, the ultimate legality of the Act's provisions governing noncitizens
abroad would depend on its reasonableness.
1. Reasonableness Factors
Section 403(2) of the Restatement (Third) ofForeign Relations Law lists
several factors to consider when making the reasonableness determination.°8
Section 403(2) provides:
Whether exercise ofjurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) ... the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or
has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the reg-
ulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate
106. Id. § 403(1); see United States v. Javino, 960 F.2d 1137, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1992)
(finding that extraterritorial application of Firearms Act fails to meet reasonableness require-
ment); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 923 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (recognizing that extraterritorial application of Sherman Anti-Trust Act must meet
reasonableness requirement); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d
597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (expressing reasonableness requirement in terms of international
comity and fairness), aft'd, 749 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Evans, 667 F. Supp.
974, 980-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (rejecting defendant's argument that United States unreasonably
regulated foreign persons who wish to resell American made defense articles). The court in
Timberlane reflected the logic behind the reasonableness requirement in stating that "at some
point the interests of the United States are too weak and the foreign harmony incentive for
restraint too strong to justify an extraterritorial assertion ofjurisdiction." Timberlane, 549 F.2d
at 609. For a foreign court's recognition of the reasonableness requirement, see German Court
Backs Cartel Office in Banning Effects ofForeign Merger on Domestic Market, 4 Comm. Mkt.
Rptr. (CCH) 40,571 (June 5, 1984).
107. See supra Part IV (explaining howjurisdictional rules do not justify ILSA).
108. REsTATEmeNT(Tr D) § 403(2).
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such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regula-
tion is generally accepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state." 9
The reasonableness factors do not carry equal importance in all situations.1 °
This discussion focuses only on those factors clearly pertinent to ILSA.
Examination of these factors demonstrates that ILSA represents an unreason-
able attempt by the United States to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over
noncitizens located abroad.
The first factor calls for consideration of the extent to which the activity
takes place within the United States, or has a substantial, direct, and foresee-
able effect upon or in the United States."' The investment activities over
which prescriptive jurisdiction is questionable (i.e., the investments by non-
citizens abroad) do not take place within the United States. Nor do these
109. Id.; see id. § 403 cmt. b (noting that § 403(2) does not provide exhaustive list of con-
siderations).
110. Id.
111. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,818, (1993) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that reasonableness inquiry turns on many factors including extentto which activity
takes place within territory of regulating state); United States v. Javino, 960 F.2d 1137, 1142-43
(2d Cir. 1992) (same); Plessey Co. v. General Elec. Co., 628 F. Supp. 477, 490-91 (D. Del.
1986) (findingthatjurisdiction ofWilliamsActnottriggered, in partbecauseactivitiestookplace
outside ofUnited States); RESTATEMENT(TmRD) § 403(2)(a) (providing reasonableness factors).
But see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (criticizing consideration of this factor because proper analysis already requires weighing
this factor when deciding whether one of threshold jurisdictional principles supported jurisdic-
tion) (citing Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979)
and Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 749 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1984)). The court inLakerAirways criticized the Timberlane and
Mannington Mills courts for turning to factors already considered when making the threshold
determination of whether an exercise ofjurisdiction can bejustified by one of thejurisdictional
principles. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 948. The Laker Airways court insinuated that courts
already consider, for example, the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory in
determining whether the territoriality principle can support a particular exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction. Id.; see supra Part IV.A (discussing territoriality principle). Similarly, the Laker
Airways court argued thatthe extentto which the activity has asubstantial, direct, and foreseeable
effect upon the territory already received consideration during the application of the effects
principle. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 948; see supra Part IV.B (discussing effects principle).
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investments have a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect on the United
States, a point explained in the discussion under the effects principle. 2 At
best, the investments made by noncitizens abroad indirectly affect the United
States."
3
The second factor looks atthe connections, such as nationality, residence,
or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally
responsible for the activity to be regulated." 4 ILSA's questionable prescrip-
tions govern noncitizens who do not reside in the United States. In addition,
the regulated investment activity has no economic connection to the United
States. Indeed, Congress did not attempt to base ILSA on the possible eco-
nomic effects that the investment activities could have on the United States."5
Rather, Congress based ILSA on the alleged effects of the investment activ-
ities on national security and foreign policy interests of the United States."6
Thus, the second factor fails to support a reasonableness finding.
The third factor contains many subfactors, one of which weighs the
extent to which other states regulate such activities."' This factor clearly
demonstrates ILSA's unreasonableness. No other nation attempts to regulate
noncitizens abroad investing in another state's natural resources."' A differ-
ent subfactor weighs the degree to which the desirability of such regulation
is generally accepted." 9 Arguing ILSA's general acceptability is difficult in
112. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing effects principle).
113. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing indirect effects on United
States from ILSA regulated behaviors).
114. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) § 403(2)(b). Factor (b) also suggests looking at "the connec-
tions... between [the regulating] state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect."
Id. This factor arguably favors ILSA because the regulating state and those whom Congress
presumably intended to protect (U.S. citizens) have a close connection.
115. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act §§ 2-3 (declaring that Congress based ILSA on
national security interests of United States, not on economic interests).
116. Id.
117. REsTATEMENT(THIRD) § 403(2)(c).
118. See supra note 55 (providing states' criticism ofILSA, which suggest novelty ofAct's
reach). The author cannot definitively conclude that no other state regulates noncitizens abroad
investing in another state's natural resources. However, the degree to which states have
objected to ILSA suggests the novelty of this type of regulation.
119. RESTATEmNT(THIRD) § 403(2)(c). Some American courts and commentators have
criticized an attempt to weigh "the degree to which the desirability of a regulation is generally
accepted." See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-50
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (criticizing certain reasonableness factors); Harold G. Maier, Resolving Extra-
territorial Conflicts, or "There andBackAgain,"25 VA. J. INT'L L. 7,37-39 (1984) (discussing
weaknesses of some reasonableness factors). Critics argue that this factor would require the
courts to second guess the determinations by their own legislatures that the regulations in ques-
tion were desirable. Laker, 731 F.2d at 949; Maier, supra, at 34. TheLaker court reasoned that
courts should not second guess legislative determinations of the desirability of American laws.
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light of the adamant objections from the European Union, Canada, Mexico,
and Malaysia over the intrusiveness of the act to their sense of sovereignty.120
Another consideration under the third reasonableness factor is the impor-
tance of the regulation to the regulating state."' The importance of ILSA to
the United States is difficult to measure. Even if ILSA represents extremely
important U.S. foreign policy, the other factors heavily outweigh this sub-
factor and clearly suggest the unreasonableness of ILSA.
The fourth and fifth factors are more difficult to apply to the circum-
stances surrounding ILSA and reveal little as to ILSA's unreasonableness. In
measuring reasonableness, the fourth factor considers whether there exists
justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation." The
United States could argue that it has a justified expectation in being free to
protect itself from the terrorist acts of Iran and Libya. However, the expecta-
tions ofnoncitizens abroad counterbalance this U.S. expectation. Noncitizens
abroad have a justifiable expectation in being free from U.S. regulation of
their investments in something as innocuous as another state's petroleum
resources.
The fifth factor weighs the importance of the regulation to the interna-
tional political, legal, or economic system.'" Congress enacted ILSA for
national security and foreign policy reasons, not for economic reasons. 24
Thus, the United States probably could not argue the importance of the Act to
the international economic system. Measuring whether ILSA is important to
the international political and legal systems is more difficult. Unlike the clear
importance of permitting states to regulate extraterritorially those who carry
out acts of terrorism, the political and legal importance of the extraterritorial
regulation of investments in the petroleum resources of Iran or Libya is less
obvious and depends on one's perspective. Determining this importance
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 949; see Maier, supra, at 34 (discussing Laker's criticism). The
Laker court highlights alleged problems inherent in many of the other reasonableness factors
as applied in the American legal system in addition to the one discussed in the text. See Laker,
731 F.2d. at 949 (discussing problems with other reasonableness factors).
120. See supra note 55 (citing complaints about ILSA from various states).
121. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818-19 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (weighing importance to United States of extraterritorial application of Sherman
Anti-Trust Act); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1514-15 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(upholding extraterritorial application of drug trafficking laws because of strong interest of
United States in halting flow of drugs across its borders), affd, 117 F.3d 1206 (1 th Cir. 1997);
RESTATEMENT (THRD) § 402(2)(c) (providing that reasonableness depends, in part, on impor-
tance of regulation to regulating state).
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(2)(d).
123. Id. § 402(2)(e).
124. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act §§ 2-3 (declaring that Congress enacted ILSA for
national security and foreign policy reasons, not for economic reasons).
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would require a discussion of issues beyond the scope of this Note. Neverthe-
less, whatever this factor suggests as to the reasonableness of ILSA, it cannot
outweigh the other, more easily applicable factors that strongly suggest the
Act's unreasonableness.
The sixth factor considers the extent to which the regulation is consistent
with the traditions of the international system."2 This factor fails to support
ILSA. The historical practice of nations has not included regulations as broad
in scope as ILSA. History has seen one set of similarly broad extraterritorial
regulations during the "pipeline" controversy. 126 However, in the face of
vehement objections from other states, the United States abandoned these
regulations. 27 Thus, if anything, the international system traditionally has
frowned on such broad regulations.
Under the seventh factor, reasonableness depends on the extent to which
another state may have an interest in regulating or refraining from regulating
the activity.22 The heated objection from foreign states to the extraterritorial
application ofILSA evinces their serious interest in refraining from regulating
the investment activities of their resident citizens.22 As independent and
equal sovereigns, these states have a strong interest in their freedom to decide
how much regulation to impose on their own capital exports. 3 Moreover,
Iran's and Libya's support of terrorism endangers many states,' not just the
United States. Accordingly, each endangered state has an interest in deciding
for itself how best to address this danger. By refraining from regulating the
investment activities addressed by ILSA, these countries have implicitly
decided that the potential return to the investor outweighs the speculative
threat to their national security. It would be unreasonable and ultimately an
125. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) § 403(2)(f).
126. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (discussing "pipeline" controversy).
127. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (discussing "pipeline" controversy).
128. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that because Great Britain has "heavy" interest in regulating restrictive
practices of its reinsurance companies compared to "slight" interest of United States,
extraterritorial application of Sherman Act in case would be unreasonable); United States v.
Javino, 960 F.2d 1137, 1143 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that foreign state's interest in regulating
manufacturing of firearms was sufficient to conclude that extraterritorial application of United
States Firearms Actwould be unreasonable); RESTATEMENT(THIRD) § 403(2)(g) (providingthat
reasonableness depends, in part, on extent to which another state has interest in regulating
activity); see id. § 403 reporters' note 6 (providing that reasonableness depends, in part, on
extent to which another state has interest in regulating or refraining from regulating activity).
129. See supra note 55 (citing foreign opposition to ILSA).
130. See Maier, supra note 51, at 69 (stating that state has interest in its "freedom as an
independent sovereign to govern its own society within its own territory").
131. See Ed Blanche, Iran Seen as Spearheading 'Troika of Terrorism'Against West, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1988, at A5 (discussing terrorist bombings linked to Iran and Libya).
1625
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1601 (1997)
infringement on the sovereign authority of these other states for the United
States to preempt their interests by regulating the matter.
The final factor evaluates the likelihood of conflict with regulation by
another state.' History has provided situations in which a person has faced
conflicting commands from different countries.'33 In these situations, compli-
ance with both commands proved impossible.'34 In the case of ILSA, a
conflict of this nature is unlikely. A state cannot feasibly contradict ILSA's
prescriptions by ordering its resident citizens to disregard the Act from this
point forward and invest in Iran or Libya (although a state can order persons
within its territory to fulfill existing contractual obligations relating to invest-
ments). There are, however, possible conflicts of a different nature that
support the conclusion ofthe Act's unreasonableness. Conceivably, a French
investor might appeal to a French court for an order to disregard the prescrip-
tive rules of ILSA. The French investor could also seek a similar order from
the state's legislature. The possibility ofthese latter conflicts suggests ILSA's
unreasonableness.
Under the final factor, some courts have considered the likelihood of
conflictwith another state's policies. '3 This consideration suggests the unrea-
sonableness ofILSA. A number of states have made clear their policies, which
conflict with ILSA, of giving persons within their territory freedom to make
investment decisions with respectto petroleum development in Iran or Libya.'36
Thus, even if one of the jurisdictional principles supports ILSA, the Act
fails to satisfy the reasonableness requirement. The primary considerations
supporting this conclusion include: many of those who engage in investment
132. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,1297 (3d Cir. 1979)
(considering "degree of conflict with foreign law or policy"); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) (same), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1984); RESTATEMENT (THMRD) § 403(2)(h) (providing that reasonableness depends, in part, on
likelihood of conflict with regulation of another state).
133. See Britain Defying US. Restriction in Soviet Project, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 3, 1982, at
Al (providing example of Britain ordering certain companies to fulfill contractual obligations
with Soviet Union despite fact that such action would amount to violation of American statute);
Compressors Leave LeHavrefor Soviet, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1982, at D1 (providing example
of France ordering French companies to fulfill contractual obligations with Soviet Union despite
fact that such action would amount to violation of American statute). The conflicting com-
mands cited here arose during the pipeline controversy. See supra notes 31-36 (discussing
"pipeline" controversy).
134. See supra note 133 (providing examples of situations in which companies could not
comply with both commands of different states).
135. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297 (considering degree of conflict with another
state's policies); Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615 (same).
136. See supra note 55 (providing examples of states whose policies allow persons within
their territory freedom in making investment decisions with respect to petroleum development
in Iran or Libya).
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activities proscribed by ILSA do so wholly outside the boundaries of the United
States; these same persons have no connection by way of nationality, resi-
dence, or economic activity with the United States; their acts fail to have a
direct effect on the United States; other states do not regulate, and have not reg-
ulated, foreign persons abroad who invest in natural resources of other states;
the traditions of the international system do not support the scope of the Act's
applicability; and states, as independent and equal sovereigns, have a substan-
tial interest in deciding for themselves whether to regulate investment activi-
ties within their boundaries that have no direct impact on other states.
2. Concurrent Jurisdiction: When the Exercise of Jurisdiction
Would Be Reasonable for More than One State
To address all possibilities, it is worth considering what would happen
if one of the jurisdictional principles did justify ILSA and if the Act repre-
sented a reasonable exercise of prescriptivejurisdiction. In this situation, the
United States and the nation from which the investment acts originate would
have concurrentjurisdiction. Concurrentjurisdiction over certain persons or
activities creates few problems.'37 The difficulties arise, however, when those
states possessing jurisdiction promulgate conflicting orders that force a person
to choose which order to follow.'38
International law does not provide a definitive rule for resolving reason-
able, but conflicting, assertions of prescriptive jurisdiction.'39 However,
137. See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Cuban DemocracyAct, 8
FLA. L INT'L L. 391, 393-394 (1993) (discussing how concurrentjurisdiction is notproblem per
se).
138. See supra note 133 (providing examples of companies subject to conflicting com-
mands).
139. Maier, supra note 137, at 394. An earlier school of thought believed that in cases of
conflicting commands from states exercising reasonable prescriptivejurisdiction, international
law required a tribunal to balance the interests ofthe states involved and conferjurisdiction upon
that state whose exercise ofjurisdiction was more reasonable. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (REVISED)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 403(3) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1981)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (REVISED)] (suggesting that, in case of conflicting commands, state
with greater interests in regulating acts in question would have jurisdiction as matter of law).
But see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-51 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (criticizing balancing of interests test provided in Restatement (Revised)); Maier, supra
note 119, at 39 (same). The Laker court criticized the court in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976), for engaging in the balancing test by
weighing factors such as "the importance of the regulation to the regulating states." Laker, 731
F.2d at 949. The Laker court objected to the balancing of such factors because their political
nature made them inappropriate for ajudiciary to evaluate comparatively. Id. In response to
such criticism, the Restatement (Third) now reflects the principle of comity, in which a state
with reasonable jurisdiction should, but is not required by international law, defer to the
jurisdiction of another state whose interests are greater. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403(3).
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judicial and governmental bodies have turned to the principle of comity in
resolving these conflicts.14° In simplest terms, the comity principle embodies
a kind of international golden rule: each nation gives the respect to the laws,
policies, and interests of other nations that it would have others give to its own
in the same or similar circumstances.
141
The principle of comity is not relevant to ILSA. The comity principle
only applies when a party faces conflicting commands from two states assert-
ing reasonable jurisdiction.14 ' As noted, a state cannot feasibly order persons
within its territory to disregard ILSA and to invest in Iran or Libya. 43 Thus,
Despite theRestatement (Third)'s recognition that international law does not require application
of the balancing of interest test in situations of conflicting, but reasonable, assertions ofjuris-
diction, the question of what standard a given domestic court will employ remains unsettled.
See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating
need to employ balance of interest test); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A.,
549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) (applying balance of interest test).
140. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,796 (1993) (employing comity
analysis); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,954 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (same); Maier, supra note 51, at 69-72 (discussing comity principle); Maier, supra note
119, at 38 (same); Maier, supra note 137, at 394 (same). Some courts have turned to a
balancing of interest test in lieu of applying the comity principle. See supra note 139 (citing
cases which apply balance of interest test).
141. See Maier, supra note 119, at 15 (discussing golden rule); Maier, supra note 51, at
70 (same). See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (discussing international
comity). Speaking on the principle of comity, the United States Supreme Court in Hilton v.
Guyot stated:
"Comity" in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand,
nor of mere courtesy and goodwill, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights
of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Id. at 163-64.
142. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509. U.S. at 799 (requiring conflict before applying
comity principle); Maier, supra note 137, at 394 (same); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509
U.S. at 799 (stating that "'the fact that conduct is lawful in the state in which it took place will
not, of itself, bar application of the United States... laws,' even where the foreign state has a
strong policy to permit or encourage such conduct" (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(TIRD) § 415 cmt. j)).
143. See supra text accompanying note 136 (discussing how person will probably not face
conflicting commands with respect to issue of investment in Iran or Libya). It is worth noting
that while a person cannot face commands conflicting those in ILSA, a person can face incon-
sistent commands. For instance, a noncitizen abroad may face both the commands of ILSA as
well as commands from her government requiring her to ignore the provisions in ILSA. A true
conflict does not exist however because this noncitizen abroad can comply with her govern-
ment's commands without violating ILSA (i.e., the person may ignore ILSA, but choose not to
invest in Iran or Libya for reasons other than ILSA). Nevertheless, a jurisdictional tension
would exist, the resolution of which may rely on principles of comity.
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according to international law, if the United States has reasonable jurisdiction
over the noncitizen abroad, then theoretically both it and the state in which the
investor is located legitimately possess jurisdiction.1" In such a situation,
states usually handle these jurisdictional tensions through agreements on the
diplomatic level or by appealing to international organizations such as the
World Trade Organization.145 But, as the prior discussion demonstrates, the
circumstances surrounding ILSA fail to provide a situation in which two states
possess legitimate jurisdiction over the noncitizens abroad. None of the
jurisdictional principles discussed support the United States's claim to juris-
diction over these people.146 And even if one of the jurisdictional principles
support ILSA, applying the Act's provisions to noncitizens abroad would
violate the reasonableness requirement.
4 7
V Jurisdiction to Enforce
In addition to restrictions on a state's jurisdiction to prescribe a law,
international law imposes restrictions on a state's jurisdiction to enforce the
law. ' These latter restrictions limit the measures a state may employ to
induce or compel compliance with its laws.'49 To induce compliance with
its laws, a state may use judicial and nonjudicial enforcement measures.5 0
The Restatement discusses how nonjudicial enforcement measures usually
entail the denial of opportunities normally open to the person against whom
enforcement is sought.'' ILSA provides a prototypical example of such
nonjudicial enforcement methods. Upon finding a violation of ILSA, the
President may impose the following sanctions:5 2 (1) denial of Export-Import
Bank financing;'-" (2) denial of export licenses; 54 (3) prohibition against U.S.
financial institutions lending more than $10 million per year to the sanctioned
144. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403 (failing to require that one state defer in situation
of two states possessing reasonable claims ofjurisdiction).
145. See Barber, supra note 10, at I (discussing how European Union has challenged ILSA
and Helms-Burton Act by filing claim with World Trade Organization).
146. SeesupraParts IV.A-E (arguinglLSA's lackofsupportfromjurisdictional principles).
147. See supra Part IV.F (discussing ILSA's failure to meet reasonableness requirement).
148. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 431 (discussing jurisdiction to enforce).
149. Id. § 401.
150. Id. § 431(1); see id. § 431 cmt. c (discussing popular nonjudicial enforcement meas-
ures employed by states).
151. Id.
152. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 6 (listing possible sanctions under ILSA); see also
supra note 17 (reproducing section providing possible sanctions under ILSA).
153. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 6(1).
154. Id. § 6(2); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 431 cmt. c (listing denial of right to engage
in export transactions as typical example of nonjudicial enforcement measure).
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person;15 5 (4) prohibition against sanctioned financial institutions serving as
primary dealers of United States government bonds or as repositories of U.S.
government funds; 56 (5) ban on any United States government procurement
of any goods or services from the sanctioned person; 5' and (6) import sanc-
tions imposed by the President in accordance with the International Economic
Powers Act. "
The Restatement sets out the requirements a state must satisfy in order
to establish jurisdiction to enforce a law. 59 First, the United States must
possess jurisdiction to prescribe ILSA161 Second, the Act must satisfy a
reasonableness test for enforcement.'6 ' Finally, the United States must pro-
vide a certain level of notice and opportunity to be heard to the person against
whom the United States seeks to enforce its law.
PartIV discussed how Congress lacked jurisdictionto prescribe ILSA 63
Assuming, however, that Congress did have jurisdiction to prescribe and that
ILSA therefore satisfies the first requirement, ILSA still fails the other two
155. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 6(3).
156. Idl § 6(4).
157. Id. § 6(5); see RESTATEMENT (THIR) § 431 cmt. c (listing denial of eligibility to bid
on governmental contracts as typical nonjudicial enforcement measure).
158. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 6(6).
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 431. Restatement (Third) Section 431 provides:
(1) A state may employ judicial or nonjudicial measures to induce or compel
compliance or punish noncompliance with its law or regulations, provided it has
jurisdiction to prescribe in accordance with §§ 402 and 403.
(2) Enforcement measures must be reasonably related to the laws or regulations to
which they are directed; punishment for noncompliance must be preceded by an
appropriate determination of violation and must be proportional to the gravity of
the violation.
(3) A state may employ enforcement measures against a person located outside its
territory
(a) if the person is given notice of the claims or charges against him that is
reasonable in the circumstances;
(b) if the person is given an opportunity to be heard, ordinarily in advance of
enforcement, whether in person or by counsel or other representative; and
(c) when enforcement is through the courts, if the state has jurisdiction to
adjudicate.
Id
160. Id. § 431(1).
161. See id. § 431(1) cmt. d (discussing reasonableness requirement). Presumably, this
reasonableness requirement is different from the reasonableness requirement for establishing
jurisdiction to prescribe.
162. Id. § 431(3).
163. See supra Part IV (analyzing principles ofjurisdiction to prescribe and concluding
that ILSA violates these principles),
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requirements. The Restatement does not explain the reasonableness test. Nor
does it explicitly discuss whether the test is different from the reasonableness
test a state must pass in order to establish jurisdiction to prescribe."6 Com-
ment (d) of section 431 of the Restatement does, however, provide one exam-
ple of an application of the reasonableness test.' 6 The circumstances of this
example bear a remarkable resemblance to the circumstances surrounding
ILSA. Comment (d) indicates that it might be reasonable for the United States
to deny a foreign company of its export privileges - the right to participate in
the export of United States goods - because the company had knowingly
resold a strategic article of United States origin to country X in violation of
United States law." However, Comment (d) further provides that it would
be unreasonable for the United States to deny a foreign company export
privileges (as does ILSA) simply because it traded with country X in goods
not of United States origin. 67 Comment (d) deems such a sanction unreason-
able because ordinarily the United States would lack jurisdiction to prescribe
law with respect to such trade. 68 ILSA involves a person's investment with
country X(Iran or Libya) rather than trade. Nevertheless, the circumstances
involved in the Restatement's example and the circumstances underlying
ILSA strikingly resemble one another. This resemblance suggests that the
United States lacks jurisdiction to enforce ILSA because the Act does not
satisfy the requirement of reasonableness.
Assuming that ILSA meets the reasonableness requirement, validation of
the Act can occur only if its enforcement measures provide a certain level of
notice and opportunity to be heard.' 69 The Restatement suggests a two-step
164. See RESTATEmEN (THIRD) § 431 (failing to explain reasonableness test under state's
jurisdiction to enforce). Courts and commentators have given little attention to both the reason-
ableness test specifically and the broader concept of a state's jurisdiction to enforce more
generally. Courts and commentators cite to the proposition that a state must have jurisdiction
to enforce its law, but both fail to discuss the concept any further.
165. Id. § 431 cmt. d (providing that state's exercise ofjurisdiction to enforce is subject
to principle of reasonableness). Note that comment (d) contains some ambiguity in its discus-
sion ofthe reasonableness requirement. In making the reasonableness determination, comment
(d) suggests considering the factors relevant to making a reasonableness determination under
the same analysis of a state's jurisdiction to prescribe. See id. § 403 (requiring that exercise of
jurisdiction to prescribe be reasonable). Presumably, because the Restatement (Third) mentions
the reasonableness requirement under § 403 as well as under § 431, a state must meet a reason-
ableness requirement when determining both whether a state has jurisdiction to prescribe and
whether it has jurisdiction to enforce.




169. See id. § 431(3) (discussing requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard).
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analysis under this requirement. 7 ' First, the state must provide the person
against whom the state intends to enforce its law with reasonable notice of the
charges against him. 7 ' Second, the state must provide that person an oppor-
tunity to be heard, usually in advance of enforcement."
When faced with nonjdidicial enforcement measures as in ILSA, the
Restatement does not require formal notice such as the service of process
required for judicial enforcement."n Nonetheless, the state must give at least
some notice to the person charged, whether by mail, telegraph, telephone, or
use of intermediary. 74 Such notice should inform the person: (1) that the
enforcing state believes that the person has violated that state's law; (2) that
the state intends to execute the enforcement measures; and (3) that the person
has an opportunity to be heard before the state commences its enforcement
action. 75
Although the practices of the United States in implementing ILSA may
prove otherwise, ILSA, as written, fails to meet the notice requirement. The
most ILSA mandates in the form of notice can be found in Section 9. Upon
a determination of a violation, Section 9 "urges" the President to consult with
the government of the state in which the offender resides. 76 Following this
consultation, Section 9 mandates sanctions against the person unless the
President certifies to Congress that the foreign government has taken specific
and effective actions to terminate the investment activity.
177
This consultation does not amount to sufficient notice as required by
international law. International law requires the United States to inform the
person chargedthat he United States government believes he has violated the
Act and to inform this person that he has an opportunity to respond to the
charges. 78 ILSA requires no such notice. Consequently, ILSA fails to satisfy
170. See id. (dividing notice and opportunity to be heard into two separate requirements).
171. Id.; see id. § 431 cmt. e(i) (discussing notice requirement).
172. Id. § 431(3); see id. § 431 cmt. e(ii) (discussing opportunity to be heard requirement).
173. See id § 431 cmt. e (stating that international law does not require service of process
in order to meet notice requirement).
174. Id.
175. Id
176. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 9(a)(1).
177. Id. § 9(a)(2).
178. See RESTATEmENT(THIRD) § 431(3) cmt. e (requiring that enforcing state "give notice
to the person charged that he is believed to have violated the enforcing state's law, that
measures of enforcement are contemplated, and that he has an opportunity to respond before
enforcement action will be taken"). The Restatement allows forthe use of an intermediary when
giving notice. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (listing methods by which notice can
be effected). One could argue that by consulting with the government of the state in which the
charged person resides, the United States is using that government as an intermediary. This
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the notice requirement, which means that it also fails to provide an opportu-
nity to be heard as required by international law.
This lack of notice and opportunity to be heard presents potentially grave
problems for many foreign persons. For example, the President may errone-
ously determine that a person has violated ILSA. Without a procedure for
allowing the person to refute this finding, ILSA may deprive this person of
essential exports that they cannot obtain from other states. The inequity and
senselessness of such an erroneous deprivation is obvious. In addition, two
provisions of ILSA exacerbate the inequity. Section 9(b)(2) requires that
sanctions, once levied, remain in effect for at least one year. 17 9 Additionally,
Section 11 of the Act prohibits any court from reviewing a determination to
impose sanctions under ILSA."80
Thus, the United States lacks the jurisdiction to enforce ILSA for three
reasons. First, Congress lacked the jurisdiction to prescribe ILSA. Second,
the Act's enforcement measures fail to meet the reasonableness requirement.
Finally, ILSA's sanctioning mechanism provides inadequate notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard.
V. Conclusion-
Congress appeared to have acted with good intentions when it passed
ILSA. As the problem of terrorism remains unresolved, it continues to haunt
various states and their citizens. One almost feels a moral obligation to sup-
port a state's effort to eradicate the roots of this evil.
Nevertheless, the broader interests in both the rule of law and the equal
status of every nation place a necessary limit on a state's remedial powers.
International law recognizes a state's authority to prescribe law under five
major principles: territoriality, effects, nationality, protective, and universal-
ity.81 Those states opposing ILSA can turn to the territoriality principle to
support their decision to regulate or to refrain from regulating the capital
exports from their respective states.1 12 The United States, however, lacks
argument is flawed because nothing in ILSA requires the President to consult with the foreign
government. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 9(a)(1) (stating that Congress merely "urges"
President to consult with foreign government of state in which offender resides). Moreover,
nothing in ILSA requires the President to request that the foreign government notify the charged
person. See id. (failing to require President to request that foreign government inform offender
of charges against him).
179. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 9(b)(2).
180. Id. § 11.
181. See supra Parts IV.A-E (discussing five jurisdictional principles).
182. See supra Part IV.A (discussing territoriality principle); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 402 introductory note (stating that, despite existence of other principles, territoriality
and nationality remain principal bases ofjurisdiction to prescribe).
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support for those prescriptions in ILSA that cover noncitizens abroad.183 At
best, these prescriptions rest on questionable argumentation under the less
settled effects, protective, and universality principles.'
1 4
Even if ILSA legitimately falls within one of these principles, the Act's
unreasonableness brings it in violation of international law.'85 States have an
unquestionable interest in controlling the activities of persons within their
territory. 86 Allowing the United States to undercut this interest by regulating
persons having no relevant connection to the United States is unreasonable
and a contradiction of the central precept of international law that all nations
are of equal status." 7
Finally, at the very least, the United States lacks jurisdiction to enforce
ILSA. The Act fails to require that the United States government provide
the charged person with adequate notice. Without providing notice, ILSA also
fails to satisfy the requirement that the charged person be given an opportunity
to be heard. Thus, despite its seemingly defensible political grounds, ILSA
fails to meet three necessary elements for establishing the Act's legality: It
lacks support from the recognized prescriptive principles; it runs afoul of
notions of reasonableness; and it falls short of meeting the requisite elements
for establishing jurisdiction to enforce.
183. See supra Parts IV.A-E (discussing how ILSA lacks support from jurisdictional prin-
ciples).
184. See supra Parts IV.B, D, E (discussing ILSA under effects, protective, and univer-
sality principles).
185. See supra Part IV.F (discussing ILSA's failure to meet reasonableness requirement).
186. See Maier, supra note 51, at 69 (stating that each state has interest in its "freedom as
an independent sovereign to govern its own society within its territory").
187. See BROWNLIE, supra note 37, at 287 (stating that sovereignty and equal status of each
nation remains one of most fundamental precepts of international law).
188. See Part V (discussing lack ofjurisdiction to enforce ILSA).
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